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11 Introduction
It has been recognized for a long time that distance interacts with the diﬀusion of information.
In his seminal contribution to search, Stigler (1961) puts geographical dispersion as one of the
four immediate determinants of price ignorance. The reason is simply that distance aﬀects
various costs associated with search. In most search models, say for example Diamond (1981
and 1982), distance between agents or units implies a ﬁxed cost of making another draw in
the distribution. In other words, a spatial dispersion of agents creates more frictions and
thus more unemployment. Conventional labour economics faces diﬃculties in thinking about
these spatial diﬀerences because it is biased towards the notion of a spaceless marketplace
ruled by the walrasian auctioneer.
This is a weakness of the analysis since empirical evidence supports the idea of a clear
spatial dimension of labour markets (see for example the literature survey by Crampton,
1999). There are in fact several channels through which space aﬀects the labour market.
First, workers who live further away from jobs may have poorer labour market information
and be less productive than those living closer to jobs (Seater, 1979). This is particularly
true for younger and/or less-skilled workers who rely heavily on informal search methods for
obtaining employment (Holzer, 1987).1 The reliance on these informal methods of job search
suggests that information on available job opportunities may decay rapidly with the distance
from home (Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist, 1990). Second, distance also implies higher commuting
costs for the unemployed, which directly aﬀect the search process (Van Ommeren et al., 1997).
Third, workers residing too far away from jobs may quit their job more frequently because
of too long commuting distances (Zax and Kain, 1996). Finally, employers may discriminate
against applicants living in remote areas because of lower productivity (Zenou, 2002). As
a result it is commonly observed that unemployment rates diﬀer strongly across as well as
within local labour markets (see e.g. Blanchﬂower and Oswald, 1994, Martson, 1985, Topa,
2001).
The interaction between space and labour markets is thus complex. We have divided
our research questions into two parts. In a companion paper (Wasmer and Zenou, 2002), the
1 In Holzer (1988), it is shown that among 16-23 years old workers who reported job acceptance, 66% used
informal search channels (30% direct application without referral and 36% friends/relatives), while only 11%
using state agencies and 10% newspapers.
2focus was mainly urban and we have explicitly studied all possible urban conﬁgurations in
a job-matching framework. We have in particular shown how a public transportation policy
strongly depends on which type of urban equilibrium prevails.
The aim of the present paper is to focus instead on the labour market aspects of urban
equilibria. To this purpose, we focus on the most relevant urban equilibria of Wasmer and
Zenou (2002), the one in which the unemployed reside far away from jobs. Within this urban
equilibrium, we systematically explore the role of space, and notably the spatial dimension of
s e a r c h .W eh a v em o r es p e c i ﬁcally three questions in mind: Does search equilibrium strongly
depend on these spatial terms? Do relocation costs strongly aﬀect the equilibrium? Is long-
term unemployment a phenomenon interacting with space? Our answers are yes to three
questions.
In our approach, the matching of jobs and workers is a time-consuming process and
the number of matches per unit of time between workers and open vacancies is represented
by an aggregate matching function (à la Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides). Even if ﬁrms pay
workers their reservation wage, there is still some unemployment in the area (due to stochastic
rationing not being eliminated by price adjustment). However, in this line of search models,
the spatial dimension is often implicit. Here, we explicitly introduce it by considering that the
distance between workers’ residential locations and jobs plays an adverse role in the formation
of matches. In this respect, our model can be viewed as a natural extension of the standard
matching model. The land market will be kept rather simple in order to provide closed-form
solutions. We consider a closed piece of land (that can be thought as an urban area, a city, an
agglomeration or a region). This area is monocentric, i.e., ﬁrms are exogenously located in an
employment center and workers consume inelastically one unit of space. In our analysis, local
factors (rental price, distance to the employment center) and global factors (labour market
tightness, wages) inﬂuence workers’ location decisions, i.e. the land market equilibrium.
Within this framework, we can have diﬀerent land market equilibria. We only focus here on
the equilibrium in which the unemployed reside further away from the employment center.
We ﬁrst study the case of zero-relocation costs so that workers change location as soon as
they change employment status. We derive the labour market equilibrium in which spatial
unemployment is due to frictions in the labour market. On the one hand, the land market
equilibrium depends on aggregate variables (such as wages and labour market tightness)
since these variables aﬀect location choices of workers. On the other hand, the labour market
3equilibrium crucially depends on the land market equilibrium conﬁguration. Indeed, the
eﬃciency of aggregate matching depends on the average location of the unemployed. We
ﬁrst show that there exists a unique and stable market equilibrium in which both land and
labour markets are solved for simultaneously. We then show that space has an important role
on the interaction between land and labour markets. We notably decompose the equilibrium
unemployment rate into two parts: a pure non-spatial one (which corresponds to the standard
matching model) and a mixed of non-spatial and spatial elements, the ﬁrst element amplifying
the other one. In other words, space adds to search frictions in the labour market by making
t h ea c c e s st oj o b sm o r ed i ﬃcult.
We then investigate the case of positive moving costs paid when agents relocate within the
city.2 Between the two perfectly segregated areas appears a zone where both the employed
and the unemployed co-exist and are not mobile. We show that the size of this area goes
continuously to zero when moving costs vanish.
We ﬁnally study the endogeneity of job search eﬀort. We show that long and short-term
unemployed workers emerge and locate in diﬀerent parts of the city.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model
with no relocation costs and shows the diﬀerent roles of space in the determination of equi-
librium unemployment. Section 3 analyzes the role of positive relocation costs. Section 4
analyzes the case of endogenous search eﬀort. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Benchmark model
2.1 The setup
Firms and workers are all (ex ante) identical and the labour force is normalized to 1. It follows
that the unemployment rate u is equal to the unemployment level. Throughout the paper,
we only focus on aggregate steady-state equilibria. A ﬁrm can be in two distinct states:
either associated with a worker whose production is y units of output or unproductive in
absence of a suitable worker. To ﬁnd that suitable worker, the ﬁrm posts a vacancy. The rate
p e ru n i to ft i m ea tw h i c ht h ev a c a n c yi sﬁlled is constant over time, i.e. follows a random
Poisson process. Symmetrically, workers searching for a job will meet a vacancy at a constant
rate according to another Poisson process. The two processes are governed according to a
matching function determining the total number of contacts per unit of time: h(su,V ),w h e r e
2 See Haavio and Kauppi (2003) for a detailed two-region analysis for a similar focus with in addition credit
market imperfections.
4V denotes the number of vacancies. Observe that this matching function is written under the
assumption that all ﬁrms are located in one ﬁxed location. This is the spatial structure of
cities that we assume throughout this paper. Individual workers i have heterogenous search
eﬃciencies equal to si. Accordingly, the notation s represents the average eﬃciency of search
of the unemployed workers.
As usual, h(.) is assumed to be increasing both in its arguments, concave and exhibits
constant returns to scale. The probability for a vacancy to be ﬁlled per unit of time is then
h(su,V )





where θ = V/us is a measure of labour market tightness in eﬃciency units and q(θ) is a Poisson
intensity. Similarly, for a worker i with eﬃciency si, the probability of obtaining a job per




s ≡ θq(θ)si ≡ pi,w h e r epi is deﬁned as the intensity of the exit rate
from unemployment. The deviation from the standard model of job matching (Mortensen
and Pissarides, 1999, Pissarides, 2000) where there is no spatial dimension is the following:
the search eﬃciency parameter si depends on the location of the unemployed workers in the
city. It is further assumed that the closer the residential location to the workplace, the better
the eﬃciency and the more likely is a contact: si = s(di),w h e r edi is the location of the
worker with s0(di) < 0).3 For analytical simplicity, we assume that:
si(di)=s0 − ad i (1)
with s0 > 0 and a>0.I n t h i s f o r m u l a t i o n , s0 denotes the outcome of search eﬀort (such
as writing letters, buying newspapers ... ) in absence of spatial interaction in search while a
represents the loss of information per unit of distance.
Once the match is made, the wage is determined by a generalized Nash bargaining so-
lution speciﬁed later on. There is also a probability δ per unit of time that the match is
destroyed. In order to determine the (general) equilibrium, we will proceed as follows. We
ﬁrst study the partial land market equilibrium conﬁguration. Then, depending on the loca-
tion of workers and thus on the aggregate search eﬃciency s, we determine the partial labour
market equilibrium. Hereafter, by labour (respectively land market) equilibrium, it has to
be understood partial equilibrium. The general equilibrium involves two markets, and will be
denominated a ‘market equilibrium’.
By denoting by R(d) the land market price at a distance d from the city-center, by w the
3 In section 4, we relax this assumption and show that si and di are negatively related when search eﬀort
is aﬀected by commuting costs.
5wage earned by workers and by u the unemployment rate, we have the following deﬁnition.
A market equilibrium is a 4-uple (R(d),w,θ,u) that is solved simultaneously for the land use
equilibrium and the labour market equilibrium. We shall give below more precise deﬁnitions
of these two markets.
2.2 The allocation of workers in space
We assume, as it is quite standard in urban economics (see e.g. Brueckner, 1987 or Fujita,
1989), that the area is monocentric, i.e., all ﬁrms are exogenously located in the employment
center. The area is also linear, closed and landlords are absent. The center of the city is
located in d =0where jobs are also located. Workers are uniformly distributed in space, and
decide about their optimal residence between the employment center and the city-fringe. All
consume inelastically one unit of land.
All workers incur a travel cost to the center. Let us denote by τed and τud the transporta-
tion cost at a distance d from the employment center for respectively working activities and
unemployed speciﬁc activities (interviews, registration), with τe > τu > 0. This is in line with
studies showing that time spent to job search activities is marginal compared to employment
time (see for instance Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 1991). They also pay the land rent costs
at the market price R(d), and receive a wage w when employed and unemployment beneﬁts
b when unemployed.
We denote by U(d) and W(d) the expected discounted lifetime net income of the unem-
ployed and the employed respectively when they locate at distance d from jobs. We assume
that location changes are costless4 and further assume perfect ﬁnancial markets. With the
Poisson probabilities deﬁned above, inﬁnitely-lived workers have then the following intertem-
poral utility functions U∗ = Max
d
U(d) and W∗ = Max
d
W(d) deﬁned recursively through the
following Bellman equations:
rU∗ = b − τud∗u − R(d∗u)+p(d∗u)[W(d∗w) − U∗] (2)
rW∗ = w − τed∗w − R(d∗w)+δ [U(d∗u) − W∗] (3)
where r is the exogenous discount rate and where d∗u (resp. d∗w)m e a n st h a td∗u is chosen
so as to maximize U (resp. W).L e tu sc o m m e n t( 2 ) .W h e naw o r k e ri su n e m p l o y e dt o d a y ,
4 This is a simplifying assumption. It implies that workers change location as soon as they change em-
ployment status. In the context of European labour markets in which workers tend to experience long unem-
ployment spells, it may be a rather good approximation since, when workers become unemployed, they will
be less able to pay land rents and, after some time, they will have to relocate in cheaper places. We however
relax this assumpion in section 3.
6he/she resides in d∗ and his/her net income is b−τud∗u−R(d∗u). Then, he/she can get a job
with a probability p(d∗u) and if so, he/she relocates optimally in d∗w and obtains an increase
in income of W∗ − U∗. The interpretation of (3) is similar.
It is important to notice that, thanks to the assumption of no relocation costs, the equilib-
rium is such that all the unemployed enjoy the same level of utility U = U = U∗.T h i si sa l s o
true for the employed W = W = W∗. Indeed, any utility diﬀerential within the area would
lead to the relocation of some workers up to the point where diﬀerences in utility disappear.
In order to solve the workers’ location problem, let us introduce the concept of bid rents
(Fujita, 1989). They are deﬁned as the maximum land rent at a distance d that each type
of worker is ready to pay in order to reach his/her respective equilibrium utility level. See
Appendix 1 for an expression for these bid rents from equations (2) and (3). The land use
equilibrium R(d) is then the upper envelop of all workers’ bid rents and of the constant




,a te a c h
d ∈ [0,1]). Because p00(d)=0 , all bid rents are linear and their slopes are given by:
∂Ψu(d,U,W)
∂d
= −τu + p0(d)(W − U) < 0 (4)
∂Ψe(d,U,W)
∂d
= −τe < 0 (5)
where p0(d)=θq(θ)s0(d) < 0. The absolute value of the slopes are the marginal cost that
a worker is ready to pay in order to be marginally closer to the employment center by one
unit of space. Depending on the relative slopes, only two land market equilibria are possible:
either the employed reside at the vicinity of the employment center and the unemployed at
t h eo u t s k i r t so ft h ea r e ao rw eh a v et h er e v e r s ep a t t e r n .I nt h i sp a p e r ,w eo n l yf o c u so nt h e
equilibrium where the unemployed are far away from jobs5 b e c a u s ew ew a n tt os h o wh o wt h e
spatial access to jobs matters for the labour market outcomes of workers. The condition for
this equilibrium to occur is that the slope of the bid rent of the employed exceeds that of the
unemployed, that is:
τe − τu > θq(θ)a(W − U) (6)
This is quite intuitive: for the employed to occupy the core of the area, it must be that
their bid rents exceed those of the unemployed. This condition states that the diﬀerential
in commuting costs between the employed and the unemployed must be higher than the
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Figure 1: Bid rents and equilibrium rent, location of workers within a city.
expected return for the unemployed of being more eﬃcient in search by being marginally
closer to the center.
In this context, the land market equilibrium (U,W,db) is such that:
db =1− u (7)
Ψe(db,U,W)=Ψu(db,U,W) (8)
Ψu(df,U,W)=RA =0 (9)
This equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 1. The average eﬃciency intensity is equal to:




Thus, s is increased by a constant part s0, and is decreased by a higher distance from the
center of the average unemployed worker. At a constant unemployment rate, it decreases
with the gradient parameter a.
2.3 The labour market
Given our land market equilibrium, we can now deﬁne the labour market equilibrium and
then, solve the general problem. Let us ﬁrst have the following deﬁnition of a labour mar-
ket equilibrium: A (steady-state) labour market equilibrium (w,θ,u) is such that, given the
8matching technology deﬁned by h(su,V ),a l la g e n t s( w o r k e r sa n dﬁrms) maximize their re-
spective objective function, i.e. this triple is determined by a free-entry condition for ﬁrms,
a wage-setting mechanism and a steady-state condition.
The ﬁrst part of the labour block comes from a free-entry condition for ﬁrms, leading to
the determination of labour demand. As in standard search analysis (Pissarides, 2000), it is








where γ and y are respectively the cost of holding a vacant job and worker’s productivity.
Indeed, the value of a job J must in equilibrium be equal to the expected search cost, i.e. the
cost per unit of time multiplied by the average duration of search for the ﬁrm.
Let us now determine the wage. We do not allow ﬁrms to oﬀer diﬀerent wages according
to residential location. This is a legal constraint based on the fact that, in the real world,
one never observes ﬁrms that discriminate across identical workers according to their place of
residence. As a result, we consider here only equilibria in which wages are constant in space.6
Each period, the total surplus is shared between ﬁrms and workers through a bargaining
according to the generalized Nash-sharing rule. Let us denote by 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 the share of
workers in the total intertemporal surplus W − U + J. Then, solving the Nash-bargaining
problem, it is easy to show (see Appendix 1) that
w =( 1− α)[b +( τe − τu)db]+α[y +( s0 − adb)θγ] (12)
where db =1 −u. We thus have an expression for wages that combines usual non-spatial eﬀects
with additional spatial eﬀects. The former are given by (1−α)b+α[y + s0θγ] and correspond
to the usual Nash-bargaining solution in Pissarides (2000). The additional (spatial) part
contains ﬁrst (1 − α)(τe − τu)db, i.e. a pure spatial term: this is what ﬁrms must pay to
share the costs incurred by the workers. These costs appear as the diﬀerence between the
employed and the unemployed of the cost of the marginal worker who is the furthest away
from the employment center, i.e. located at db =1− u (at the point in space where the
land-rent diﬀerence between an employed and an unemployed agent vanishes).7 The second
6 It is possible that another equilibrium exists, in which wages would depend on distance even though the
intertemporal utility of the employed W remains constant over space. In this case, the employed’s land rent
would adjust in order for W to stay constant. There is no clear argument to rule this equilibrium out and
we thank a referee for pointing it out. However, this equilibrium is quite unlikely since, to be sustained, it
requires a lot of coordination between ﬁrms and workers.
7 See Smith and Zenou (1997) for a similar eﬀect in an eﬃciency wage framework.
9part of the additional term is −αadbθγ. It involves both spatial and labour elements. Indeed,
when db increases, the unemployed worker who is the closest from jobs (the one situated at
db =1− u) is even less close to jobs (spatial element) and thus has a lower search eﬃciency
(labour element). The outside option of employed workers then decreases, which implies a
reduction in wages.
2.4 The steady-state equilibrium
Using w and θ, the condition (6) that ensures that the land market equilibrium always exists
and is unique can be rewritten as:8






The intuition of this condition is straightforward: when the diﬀerence in commuting costs,
τe − τu, is large and/or when the loss of information per unit of distance, a, is small and/or
the search cost of ﬁrms, γ, is small, and/or the workers’ bargaining strength, α,i sl o w ,t h e n
the employed bid away the unemployed at the periphery of the city.
Combining (11) and (12), one can eliminate the wage and obtain a relation between θ
and u as follows (recalling that db =1− u):




δ + r + θq(θ)s(db)α
1 − α
¸
+( τe − τu)db (14)
We can now close the model by providing another relation between θ and u.T h i sr e l a t i o n
is given by the existence of a steady-state condition on ﬂows:
θq(θ)su=( 1− u)δ (15)
Proposition 1 When the parameters are such that θ∗ < l, then, there exists a unique market
equilibrium (R(d),θ∗,u ∗,w∗) in which the unemployed reside far away from jobs and the
employed close to jobs.
Proof. See Wasmer and Zenou (2002).
2.5 The role of space in the theory of unemployment
2.5.1 Interaction between land and labour markets
The interaction between land and labour markets is partly due to the dependence of search
eﬃciency on distance. To show that, we proceed a contrario: we assume ﬁr s tt h a tw a g e sa r e
8 Using (11) and the bargaining equation in Appendix 1, it is easy to verify that condition (6) can be
written as (13).
10exogenous and a =0 . In this case, both markets are independent. When we relax exogenous
wages and keep a =0 , there is a one-way interaction between markets: the labour market
does not depend on the land market but the land market equilibrium depends on the labour
market equilibrium through labor market tightness as workers locate in one conﬁguration or
the other depending notably on θ∗.
Finally, as soon as a>0, one has a general equilibrium interaction between the markets.
Indeed, one of the key assumption of our model is that the search eﬃciency si of each
worker i depends on the distance between residence and the job-center, i.e., si = si(d) with
s0
i(d) < 0. This implies that the land and labour markets are interdependent. Indeed, on
the one hand, the labour market strongly depends on the land market since the equilibrium
values of u∗,V∗ and θ∗ are aﬀected by the value of s. On the other hand, the land market
strongly depends on the labour market since the inequality (6) determining the land market
equilibrium conﬁguration, θ∗ < l, depends on the value of θ∗.
To evaluate the implications of this relation si(d), let us assume that si is independent
of d (a =0so that s = s0) but workers still locate in the city and thus bear land rents and
commuting costs. In this context, the inequality (6) reduces to te − tu > 0. In other words,
the land market equilibrium is independent of the labour market equilibrium. The location
choices of the employed and the unemployed, which depend on the slopes of the bid rents,
involve only transportation costs. So, since tu <t e, the unemployed reside at the outskirts of
the city, irrespective of the labour market equilibrium outcome. When wages are exogenous,
we do not have anymore equation (12) but instead w = w. So, the equilibrium is deﬁned
by two equations, (11) and (15) in which w = w. Therefore, when wages are exogenous, the
equilibrium unemployment and vacancy rates would be exactly the same as in the standard
non-spatial matching models (see e.g. Pissarides, 2000) and s = s0 is independent of the
land use equilibrium. On the contrary, when the wage is a result of a bargaining between
workers and ﬁrms, the main diﬀerence with the standard non-spatial matching model is that
commuting costs aﬀect wages. We can summarize our discussion by the following table.
Table 1: Interaction between land and labour markets
Exogenous wages Endogenous wages
a =0 No Interaction Partial Interaction (LME→LE)
a>0 Complete Interaction Complete Interaction
(LME→LE means that the interaction is from the
11land market equilibrium to the labour equilibrium)
2.5.2 A spatial Beveridge curve
One can further develop the speciﬁc role of space in observing that the locus of steady-state
depends on a and on spatial terms. For that, we describe now an intuitive way of representing
the equilibrium: in the u − V space.
As stated above, equation (11) determines a value of θ = V/(us) that gives a relation
between V and u. This is an upward sloping curve in the u − V space called the VScurve.
Furthermore, equation (15) can be rewritten as:
δ(1 − u) − Vq (V/us)=0 (16)
We obtain the so-called Beveridge curve UV. The interesting feature of this Beveridge curve
is that it is indexed by s, which depends on the spatial dispersion of the unemployed: a lower
s is associated with an outward shift of Beveridge curve in the u − V s p a c eb e c a u s em o r e
vacancies are needed to maintain the steady-state level of unemployment. If a increases or s0
decreases, the Beveridge curve is shifted away from the origin meaning that the labour market
is less eﬃcient. The same would arise if the city size increased: the unemployed would be
further away. We leave this ‘open city case’ for further research and now turn to a quantitative
investigation of the role of space on labour markets.
2.5.3 Decomposition of unemployment
Indeed, we pursue our analysis of the importance of space in equilibrium unemployment
by determining the part of unemployment only due to spatial frictions. Let us start with
exogenous wages. In this case, θ is constant and determined by (11). By using (15), the
unemployment rate is given by:
u =
δ
δ + θq(θ)[s0 − a(1 − u/2)]
(17)





the part of unemployment that is independent of spatial frictions,i . e .w h e na =0so that






(1 − u0)(1− u0/2)
¸
= u0 + us (19)
12where us ≡ u0 [a (1 − u0)(1− u0/2)/s0] is the unemployment that is only due to spatial
frictions and u0 is deﬁned by (18). Observe that us is increasing in a/s0, the parameter
representing the loss of information through distance and null when a =0 . Observe also that
the pure frictional unemployment u0 aﬀects us in the following way:








In general u0 < 0.42 so that u0 aﬀects positively us, showing the full interaction between
land and labour markets. This is quite natural: higher ‘spaceless’ unemployment u0 aﬀects
positively frictions due to spatial heterogeneity (this is a side-eﬀect of the dispersion of space
on the unemployed themselves, which increases the average distance to jobs).
Under endogenous wage setting, a larger set of parameters determines the spatial com-
ponent of unemployment. First, the endogenous wage w deﬁn e db y( 1 2 )c a nb ed e c o m p o s e d
into three parts:
w = w0 + wt − wa (20)
where w0 =( 1− α)b + α(y + s0θγ) is the wage that would receive workers if all agents
were located in the same point, wτ =( 1− α)(τe − τu)(1 − u) reﬂects the impact of distance
on transportation costs and thus on wages, and wa = α a (1 − u)θγ t h ef a c tt h a ts e a r c h
eﬃciency varies with distance to jobs (this was called the ’outside option eﬀect’ of distance in
the previous section). By using a Taylor expansion, one could also decompose θ in diﬀerent
parts, thus further decomposing the spatial part of unemployment into three parts itself.
This is a bit involving for just ﬁnding a decomposition looking exactly as the decomposition
of wages.
Overall, compared to the non-spatial case, unemployment increases because of the loss of
information due to spatial dispersion of agents and also because of the wage compensation
of commuting costs. However, it also tends to decrease because of the outside option eﬀect
that reduces wages.
In addition, a natural question to raise is whether the eﬃciency results of the decentralized
search equilibria (Lucas and Prescott 1974, Moen 1997) still holds when the spatial dispersion
of agents creates frictions. We explored this question in the urban context of Wasmer and
Zenou (2002, Section 5) with a focus on the subsidy on commuting costs. We notably showed
that in the general case, the standard Hosios-Pissarides condition, stating that the bargaining
power of workers α has to be equal to the (negative of) elasticity of the matching rate of
13ﬁrms −θq0(θ)/q(θ), does not hold when commuting cost between employed and unemployed
diﬀer. The reason is that the aggregate welfare function includes commuting costs and, given
that employees pay higher costs, the social planner prefer a little bit more unemployment,
which is obtained thanks to a higher bargaining power of workers, beyond what it takes to
internalize the matching externalities.
3 Positive relocation costs
The model developed above had no relocation costs. Although this assumption is quite
frequent in urban economics, its relevance may depend on the nature of the labour market.
Indeed, when unemployment and employment spells are short (i.e. a U.S. style of labour
market), it is not necessarily appealing: low-income households do not necessarily change
their residential location as soon as they change their employment status. However, in a
European context, long spells of employment and unemployment make it more likely that
relocation and labor transitions coincide, in which case our benchmark assumption of absence
of mobility costs is relevant.
Surprisingly, the issue of relocation costs has been totally ignored by the urban literature.
To the best of our knowledge, the only urban/labor papers that explicitly deal with relocation
costs are that of Brueckner and Zenou (2003) and Coulson, Laing and Wang (2001). In both
papers, there are two areas in the city: the center and suburbs. However, in the ﬁrst paper,
the authors use the extreme assumption that relocation costs are so high that workers never
change location. In the latter, it is assumed that it is costless to commute within an area of
the city but costly to commute from one area to another. Here we investigate an intermediate
case in which some workers are mobile and some are not and relocation costs are positive
within an area.
3.1 Setup and deﬁnitions
Let us thus assume that relocation costs exist, are ﬁnite, and denote by C the instantaneous
amount of eﬀort and money supported by moving individuals. To simplify, we consider now
that s is independent of distance (i.e. a =0 ) and that wages are exogenous and ﬁxed at a
level w.
In equilibrium, there will be four groups of agents: the mobile employed and unemployed,
and the immobile employed and unemployed. Employed workers are said to be mobile (resp.
immobile) when, hit by a job-destruction shock, they decide to relocate to another part of
14the city (resp. stay at the same location). A similar deﬁnition of mobility can be adapted to
the unemployed depending on the occurrence of a successful application to a job.
In order to keep the model tractable, we assume that these groups always form spa-
tially homogenous communities. In other words, we only focus on equilibria in which mobile
employed workers are perfectly segregated, mobile unemployed workers are perfectly segre-
gated, and ﬁnally the immobile workers (both employed and unemployed) are integrated and
randomly but evenly distributed in a part of the city. This latter part of the land market
equilibrium is natural since, in the long-run, immobile workers are distributed according to
an ergodic distribution of the employment/unemployment process. Furthermore, in order
to be consistent with the previous analysis, we study an urban conﬁguration in which the
employed are close to the city-center and the unemployed live at the outskirts of the city.
More precisely, as d increases from 0 to 1, we will have the mobile employed, the immobile
employed/unemployed and the mobile unemployed workers .
Superscripts m and i respectively indicate mobility and immobility. Denote by E and
U the subsets of [0,1] in which the employed and the unemployed respectively reside, with
E ∪ U =[ 0 ,1].D e n o t eb yEm and Ei the subsets of E in which the employed are mobile and
immobile respectively and by Um and Ui the subsets of U in which the unemployed are mobile
and immobile respectively. Observe that Ei is the complement of the subset Em in E and Ui is
the complement of the subset Um in U. Observe also, because of the assumption made above
(groups always form spatially homogenous communities), each subset, Em, Ei, Um and Ui,i s
connected and we have in the city Em ∪ Ei ∪ Ui ∪ Um =[ 0 ,1].O b s e r v eﬁnally that, among
the immobile, the employment status is not relevant because, when someone who is employed
and lives in Ei loses his/her job, he/she stays in Ei. The same applies for an unemployed in
Ui who has found a job. As a result, we can deﬁne a subset I = Ei ∪ Ui = Ei = Ui,w h i c h
includes all the immobile (employed and unemployed). Figure 2 illustrates these diﬀerent
sets.
As in the previous analysis, the mobile employed leave their area after a shock to become
unemployed in Um and reciprocally, the mobile unemployed leave Um only to go to Em.A sa
result, in steady-state, the intertemporal utility of the employed and the unemployed has to
be constant over location and we must have Um(d)=U
m for all d ∈ Umand Wm(d)=W
m
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Figure 2: Location of mobile and immobile workers in the city
paid by mobile workers upon transition:
d∈Um ⇒ rU













where p = θq(θ)s0.F o rt h ei m m o b i l ew o r k e r s ,w eh a v ei n s t e a d :










where, now, the intertemporal utility functions of the immobile workers explicitly depend on
their location d.
3.2 Equilibrium condition on location
To characterize the new equilibrium, let us denote by dα and dβ the border between the
mobile and immobile employed, and the immobile and mobile unemployed respectively. The
length of Em and Um are thus respectively given by dα and 1 − dβ while the length of I is
dβ − dα. In order to characterize this equilibrium, we must write conditions that guarantee
that no immobile worker wants to relocate and that no mobile worker do not want to relocate.
These conditions are twofold. A ﬁrst set of conditions imposes the continuity of utility within
the same employment status. Indeed, the land rent determination process imposes that the





A second set of conditions imposes that, upon a transition (from employment to unem-
ployment or from unemployment to employment), immobile workers do not want to relocate.
Lemma 1: For a non-degenerate equilibrium to exist, we need the two following conditions
to hold:
Wi(dβ)=W
m − C (27)
Ui(dα)=U
m − C (28)
Proof: See Appendix 2.
3.3 Land rents
The bid rents of workers are given in Appendix 2. We are interested in their determination











or, in other words that there is no discontinuity in the equilibrium land rent at exactly dα
and dβ.
The equilibrium in the land market implies that the bid rents are equal to the rent, i.e.
Ψi
e(d)=R(d) for all d<d α
Ψi
e(d)=Ψi
u(d)=R(d) for all dα <d<d β
Ψi
u(d)=R(d) for all dβ <d
Ψm
u (1)=RA
From the bid-rent equations in Um and Em, we know that
∂R/∂d=−τu for dβ <d
∂R/∂d=−τe for d<d α
















Figure 3: Proﬁle of rents in a city with relocation costs.
where κ, the negative of the slope of the rent for mobile workers, has to be calculated. It is
shown to be a constant in Appendix 2 and given by (40). By continuity, one can obtain the
proﬁle of rents that is illustrated in Figure 3.9
3.4 Equilibrium
It is now time to count unknowns and equations. All rents depend on dα, dβ, W
m, U
m and
Ui(dα) and W(dβ) and ﬁnally ∂Ui/∂d, i.e. 7 unknown variables. Equation (37) in Appendix
2 provides a link between W
mand U
m. Equations (28) and (27) provide a link between
Ui(dα) (resp. W(dβ))a n dU
m (resp. W
m). Finally, (21) and (22) provide another link
between W
mand U
m, the rents being functions of the unknown described above. The last
two equations are given by the continuity of utility functions, i.e. (25) and (26). All equations
are linear, the system has thus one solution except in a degenerate case of measure zero in
the space parameters, which we ignore hereafter.
In the absence of relocation costs, when C goes to zero, we can see using (28) and (27)
that Ui(dα)=U
m and Wi(dβ)=W
m, which, using (25) and (26), leads to
W
m = Wi(dα)=Wi(dβ) and U
m = Ui(dα)=Ui(dβ) (29)
9Given the absence of discontinuities in rents, we have R(d
β)=τud










18If we had dβ >d α, there would be a contradiction between the equations above and the
fact that the surplus of immobile workers is strictly decreasing with distance as indicated in
equation (38) in Appendix 2. This necessarily implies that dα = dβ. On other words, we are
back to our equilibrium described in section 2, with a =0and exogenous wage.
With positive relocation costs, i.e. a strictly positive C, we have, using (25), (26), (28)
and (27) that
C =Ui(dβ) − Ui(dα) (30)
C =Wi(dα) − Wi(dβ) (31)
Summing those two equations and using an expression for the surplus in equation (38) in
Appendix 2 leads to
dβ − dα =
2C(r + p + δ)
τe − τu
(32)
This is a key equation determining the size of the middle area and thus the cost imposed by
the full-mobility assumption made in the ﬁrst section of our paper. The size of the immobility
area thus increases with C and with all turnover rates, and is reduced by the diﬀerence in
commuting costs between the employed and the unemployed workers. The intuition is that,
to remain immobile, one has to expect fast transitions in the labor market (so that waiting
for another employment transition to remain in the same location is the best strategy) or low
gains from mobility in terms of commuting costs.
One can also use steady-state conditions on ﬂows of workers. The ﬁrst one is related
to immobile workers. Denote by φ the fraction of immobile unemployed workers in the city.
Then, the unemployment rate u is given by the following identity u = φ(dβ − dα)+1− dβ.
Indeed, in Um, which length is 1−dβ, all workers are unemployed whereas among the immobile
workers, there are only φ who are unemployed (we have normalized the total labor force to
1). Note that this equation brings two additional unknowns (u and φ). One thus need a
second steady-state condition on mobile workers:
dαδ = p(1 − dβ) (33)
which states that, upon a δ-shock, mobile employed workers relocate to the periphery, while
there is a corresponding ﬂow of mobile unemployed workers accessing employment and relo-
cating to the center. Equations (32) and (33) uniquely determine dα and dβ.
Finally, note from (40) in Appendix 2 that one can easily check that ∂Ui/∂d is positive
(the immobile unemployed workers are better oﬀ closer to the mobile unemployed workers)
19while ∂Wi/∂d is negative (the immobile employed are better oﬀ close to the mobile employed
workers); this justiﬁes ex-post the assumption of Lemma 1.
T og e tas e n s eo ft h es i z eo ft h ea r e aI, which is equal to dβ − dα,o n ec a nm a k eaf e w
back-of-the-enveloppe calculations. Suppose that the cost of moving, including eﬀort and
time, is equivalent to 1 000 euros. Now suppose that τe − τu represent about 10 000 euros
per year (including gas, car insurance, time). Assume that r =5 % , δ =2 %and p =0 .5.
Thus,
dβ − dα =
2 ∗ 1000 ∗ 0.57
10000
=0 .11
This means that eleven percent of workers in the city are immobile. Plugging into (33), we
further obtain dα =0 .77 and thus dβ =0 .88, for an unemployment rate of 13%. It follows
that φ =0 .1.
In line with the mechanisms of the previous section, one can also investigate by how much
the average distance of the unemployed is modiﬁed (denote it by d(C) and let us compare
it to d(0) in the no-relocation cost). Some of the unemployed are immobile and have an
average location of dβ+da
2 . The mobile ones are located on average in 1+dβ
2 . The latter are a
number 1−dβ while the former are a number φ(dβ−dα).D e n o t eb yζ(C)=φ(dβ−dα)/u the
weight of immobile workers with ζ(0) = 0. Accounting for those weights, we have an average







The ﬁrst result is that with the calculations above, we have d(C) ∈ (0.83;0,94) where this
interval is given by the average distance of the immobile and mobile workers respectively.
The weight ζ(C) is equal to 0.084 which implies that d(C)=0 .931, while in the absence
of relocation cost, the average distance would be 1 − u/2=0 .935. Again the diﬀerence is
marginal and only by 0.4%, although the existence of relocation costs here ﬁxes some of the
unemployed closer to jobs and avoids them being out of jobs by being far away from the
employment center.
To conclude this part, one can observe that relocation costs indeed change the derivation
of the equilibrium. This adds an area in the middle of the city in which employed and
unemployed workers are immobile, pay the same rent and continuously overlap (there is per
unit of space a density φ = 10%). When relocation costs disappear, we return to our previous
equilibrium. This section has thus generalized the frictionless land market.
204L o n g t e r m u n e m p l o y e d a n d s p a c e
Having shown the interactions between space and the labour market in assuming that search
eﬃciency depended on space, and having extended the model to positive relocation costs, we
need to better justify our initial assumption on search eﬃciency. We relax this assumption
and instead derive this relation, in making explicit the search process and the structure of
costs associated with it. We obtain new results, notably another link between the location of
workers and their labour market outcomes. Notably, we introduce two classes of unemployed
workers: the long run and short run unemployed workers.
For that, we go back to the model of section 2 where relocation costs were assumed to
be zero. Each individual’s search eﬃciency si now depends only on his/her job search eﬀort
denoted by e. We assume decreasing returns to scale to eﬀort, i.e., s0(e) > 0 and s00(e) ≤ 0.
As above, each interview is carried out in the employment center and thus involves transport
costs. We denote by Cu(e,d) the search costs associated with a level of eﬀort e for a worker
living at a distance d from the employment center.10 We assume that the search commuting
cost is an increasing and convex function of the eﬀort level e devoted to job search, i.e.,
∂Cu/∂e>0 and ∂2Cu/∂2e ≥ 0, and that, quite naturally, ∂2Cu/∂e∂d>0:t h es e a r c he ﬀort
marginally costs more further away from jobs. There is therefore a trade-oﬀ between search
costs and returns associated with a higher probability to exit from unemployment. We have
therefore the following proposition.
Proposition 2 When workers choose their eﬀort, their search eﬃciency and thus their prob-
ability of obtaining a job decreases with the distance to jobs.
Proof: See Appendix 3.
The intuition of this result is as follows. When choosing their optimal level of eﬀort,
the unemployed workers equalize their marginal gain (which is the probability generated by
one more interview times the surplus when leaving unemployment) and their marginal loss
(which is the marginal commuting cost of searching for a job). Then, because search eﬀort
marginally costs more further away from jobs, individuals search less in remote places and
thus their probability to ﬁnd a job decreases with distance to jobs.11
10 In the previous sections, the assumption of costs was Cu(e,d)=τu d.
11 We ﬁnd no multiple equilibria in agents locations in space despite a cumulative mechanism. Indeed,
being closer increases search eﬃciency, which further induces the incentives to be closer, etc... This is due to
the assumption of decreasing returns to eﬀort, i.e. s
00 < 0. There is however a potential for multiple urban













Figure 4: Location of workers within a city with endogenous search eﬀort.
Observe that (1) is not true anymore since, according to (43) in Appendix 3, the relation
between search eﬃciency s(.) and distance d is not linear. This implies in particular that
the unemployed workers’ bid rent is not anymore linear but convex. Therefore, a new land
market conﬁguration can emerge in which the unemployed reside both at the vicinity of the
employment center and at the outskirts of the city while the employed live in between the
unemployed (see Figure 4).12 In this case, even though all the unemployed enjoy the same
utility level, the ones who reside close to the employment center experience short unemploy-
ment spells because their search eﬃciency is very high whereas those who live further away
are long term unemployed since their probability to ﬁnd a job is quite low. Indeed, either
workers reside in remote areas, are long run unemployed, live on welfare but pay very low
land rents or reside close to jobs, experience short unemployment spells but pay a very high
land rent. Thus, space (or location) makes workers heterogeneous in terms of access to em-
ployment: those who are further away from jobs experience longer unemployment spells (see
e.g. Rogers, 1997 for empirical evidence).
We can also analyze the interaction between space and equilibrium unemployment. By
assuming for simplicity that wages are exogenous, the unemployment rate is given by u =
12See also Smith and Zenou (2003), for a similar result.
22δ





where z replaces distance in the integral for notational convenience. In Appendix 3, we
propose an example for an iso-elastic search-eﬀort function.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have modelled the important interaction between the spatial dispersion of
economic agents and the imperfection in information about economic opportunities. We have
ﬁrst demonstrated that there exists a unique and stable market equilibrium in which both
land and labour markets are solved for simultaneously. We have investigated how space aﬀects
search by focusing on the interaction between land and labour markets. We have explored
the mechanics of causality from the labour market to the land market and reciprocally, and
further decomposed unemployment into a spatial part and a spaceless part. We have also
shown the importance of relocation costs since it introduces a new area in the city where
employed and unemployed workers are immobile. Finally, we have seen that when distance
a n ds e a r c he ﬀort are complement in the cost function of individuals, long-term and short-term
unemployed endogenously emerge and locate in very diﬀerent location within a city.
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25Appendix 1: Section 2
Bid rents
From equations (2) and (3), the bid rents of the unemployed and employed are respectively given
by:
Ψu(d,U,W)=b − τud + p(d)W − [r + p(d)]U (34)
Ψe(d,U,W)=w − τed + δU − (r + δ)W (35)
By using (34), (35), (7) and replacing them in (8) and (9), we obtain:
W − U =
w − b − (τe − τu)db
r + δ + p(db)
(36)
where w,u,θ will be determined at the labour market equilibrium and p(db)=[ s0 − a(1 − u)]θq(θ).
Wage determination






By using (36), we easily obtain (12).
Appendix 2: Section 3
Bid rents














e(d,Ui(d),Wi(d))=w − τed − (r + δ)Wi(d)+δUi(d)
Ψi
u(d,Ui(d),Wi(d))=b − τud − (r + p)Ui(d)+pWi(d)




















,n a m e l y :
U
m(r + p)=b − τu − pC + pW
m (37)
while, for all d between dα and dβ,w eh a v e
Wi(d) − Ui(d)=
w − b − (τe − τu)d
r + p + δ
(38)
We then notice that (23) and (38) implies the ﬁrst equation below,
∂R/∂d=−r∂Ui/∂d − τu −
p(τe − τu)
r + δ + p
(39)
∂R/∂d=−r∂Wi/∂d − τe +
δ(τe − τu)
r + δ + p
while the second is obtained with (24) and (38) but is redundant with the ﬁrst one.
Finally, note that equations (30) and (31) provide an expression for ∂Ui/∂d = C(dβ−dα),w h i c h
then leads, using the equilibrium value for dβ − dα,t o
2C2(r+p+δ)
τe−τu . Then, using (39), we obtain an
expression for κ,t h a ti s
κ =




r + δ + p
(40)
P r o o fo fL e m m a1
The utility of agents in I is not constant in space, contrary to the utility of mobile agents. We
postulate that it is linear in distance, i.e. Ui(d) and Wi(d) are linear. Inspection of (23) and (24)
suggests that this is the case only if the rent is itself linear. This will be shown ex-post. Thus, the
minimum of Ui(d), d ∈ I is reached either in dα or dβ.I nI, we necessarily have Ui(d) ≥ U
m − C
with equality at the minimum, i.e. Ui(dminU)=U
m − C.I fdminU = dβ,o n ew o u l dh a v ea
contradiction with (26) for strictly positive C. Thus, we look for equilibria in which dminU = dα.
A similar reasoning applies to the immobile employed. The minimum of utility of employed is thus
27reached at dβ. This implies that, in a non-degenerate equilibrium, (28) and (27) must hold. We
proved in this Appendix (see above, equation (38)) that, for all d between dα and dβ,w eh a v e
Wi(d) − Ui(d)=
w − b − (τe − τu)d
r + p + δ
,
i.e., for the immobile workers, the surplus of a job is decreasing with distance from the center. This
suggests that indeed, the minimum of the utility of the employed in I is reached in dβ and the
minimum of the utility of the unemployed is reached in dα, so that our postulate is correct. This is
formally established at the end of section 3.
Appendix 3: Section 4
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
When workers choose endogenously their eﬀort level, the value of unemployment can be written
as:








while the value of employment is still given by (3). The unemployed worker located at a distance d
from the employment center chooses e∗ that maximizes his/her intertemporal utility (41). The ﬁrst
order condition on eﬀort yields:
θq(θ)s0(e∗)(W − U)=∂Cu(e∗,d)/∂e (42)















Assume s(e)=eσ,w i t hσ < 1/2 for reasons that will become clear below, and that C(e,d)=




























Space has an impact on s through the parameter τu which is the cross-derivative of the cost function
for the unemployed, i.e.
∂2C(e,d)
∂e∂d . Subsidizing search costs for the unemployed would decrease τu
and increase aggregate search eﬃciency. It is also reﬂected in the term (1 − u)
1−2σ
1−σ which, as before,
reﬂects the average distance between unemployed workers and jobs.
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